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Abstract:This article explores the causes underlying a strong presence of violent non-state actors (VNSAs)
in South America. Based on a case study of the border area between Colombia and Venezuela, the
research relies on a broad empirical data collected from newspapers, official documents and interviews.
The analytical perspective has been grounded on a theoretical framework of four dimensions: (i) funding
and illegal activities, (ii) presence in strategic regions, (iii) low state presence and (iv) violence, which
identifies different forms of presence of VNSAs. When questioned about how VNSAs create new forms of
alternative governance in a territorial space of fragile statehood, the results tend to reveal a context in which
state governance seems to overlap the alternative and illegal governance of VNSAs, creating a fragile and
hybrid governance in the region.
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1. Introduction
Levitsky (2008) identified the existence of black spots in
territorial spaces to indicate fruitful areas for operations
conducted by illegal groups and suggested that: “‘Black
spots’ (or ‘black holes’) are localized areas within a state,
over which the government has no formal governance. The
type of order prevailing in those territories is almost always
unknown by government authorities and the international
community.” [1] Security agencies and scholars [2–4] have
little oversight of “black spots” in Latin America, transforming
them in fertile ground for insurgent groups, narcotraffickers
and criminals to freely develop illicit activities, indistinguish-
able if “black spots” are located in developed or developing
territories, and independently from the various possibilities
of dimensions they are presenting
In Latin America, as well as in other regions of the world,
“black spots” are formed in places where the governance
of the state is deficitary, lacking in the guarantee of basic
services to the population of those regions, and causing a
vacuum that would be soon filled by the non-governmental
authority of non-state armed groups—or more precisely,
Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs)—that also conduct activ-
ities such as money laundering, arms trafficking, trafficking
in persons, kidnapping, smuggling, extortion, as well as
common and political crimes. States that present social
and dysfunctional institutions, such as Mexico, countries
that are part of the Northern Triangle of Central America
(Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador), countries bordering
the Amazon region and those located on the triple border
c© 2018 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
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area in South America (Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina) can all
be examples of states presenting difficulties in monitoring
and generating the effective development within their border
environments [5].
Some causal dimensions have favored the presence
and strengthening of VNSAs in Latin America. First, the
solid sources of funding of VNSAs achieved through illicit
activities; second, and linked to a traditional dimension, the
low state presence in the development of public policies,
that has reinforced VNSAs in strategic regions; third, ex-
pression of the relational dimension, the VNSAs questioning
of the state monopoly of force. However, the explanatory
dimensions of VNSAs in Latin American black spots can
not be attributed solely to those three dimensions.
The paper explores determinant variables (dimensions)
to explain different levels of governance in the area located
at the border, between Colombia and Venezuela. In turn,
we seek to find evidences supporting our claim about the
structure on dimensions to identify how VNSAs create an
alternative governance on borders. Therefore, we will ex-
amine the presence and actions of VNSAs in a fragile zone
like the Colombian territory at the border with Venezuela,
that has become a critical spot in the South American terri-
tory, as indicate by some researchers [2,6,7]. And the exact
critical nature of this area has been the criterion of choice
for our case study over black spots.
Thus, the current paper designs a theoretical frame-
work that establishes a nexus between VNSAs’ access to
funding, geographical scope, use of violence and low state
presence. We use the structure of dimensions to identify
how VNSAs develop alternative governance on frontiers.
The analysis of those dimensions through which VNSAs
operate on the Colombian border with Venezuela is made
through the description of different kind of VNSAs and their ac-
tivities based on empirical data collected from documents,
consisting of approximately 100 daily newspaper articles
published between 2012 and 2016. Among the Colombian
daily newspapers, we have analysed articles published by El
Tiempo, The Herald, InSight Crime, The Colombian. On the
other side, Venezuelan daily newspapers, like El Nacional, El
Universal and La Verdad, have been used. These newspapers
have been relevant for the understanding of: (i) the location of
the VNSAs region of operation, (ii) the actors involved and (iii)
the type of illegal activity. Certainly, although newspapers are
not the most consistent source of data, they are very helpful
to enlighten the researcher when it comes to investigate the
practices of groups carrying out illicit activities. “Newspapers
help to show what information policymakers had and provide
clues as to what events they regarded as important. In this
way, newspapers help us to recapture the perspective of offi-
cials at the time ([8], p.108). For the purposes of this paper,
interviews with an academic and a military both in Caracas
and Bogota, were taken. Interviews represent complementary
sources as ”the use of multiple sources is one way to enhance
the construct validity of operational definitions” [9].
The article is divided into four main sections, other than
this introduction. The first one is presenting the theoretical
debate on VNSAs and theirs dimensions. Subsequently, we
define the empirical assessment of the presence of VNSAs
on the border between Colombia and Venezuela, where
they have developed new ways of governance. In the third
section, the theoretical framework is applied to the empiri-
cal data and connected to each dimension to explain how
formal governance is affected by the actions and motiva-
tions of VNSAs. In the last section, we explore the initial
argument about alternative governance on the Colombian
and Venezuelan borders in order to offer some conclusions.
2. Theorizing on VNSAs and the Dimensions of their
Performance
The complex nature of governance is further complicated
by the emergence and growing importance of institutions,
movements and formations that have their origins in the
effects of and reactions to globalization. The emergence
of these new forces is a consequence of poor state per-
formance, and their activities can contribute to the further
weakening of state structures. Where management state
agencies are incapable of delivering (or unwilling to deliver)
security and other basic services, and where traditional soci-
etal structures have been substantially undermined, people
will turn to other social entities for support. In this situa-
tion, the actors perceived as powerful and effective include
warlords and their militias in outlying regions, gang leaders
in townships and squatter settlements, vigilante-type orga-
nizations, ethnically-based protection rackets, millenarian
religious movements, transnational networks of extended
family relations, organized crime or new forms of tribalism.
[10] Occasionally, these new formations have seized power
in certain regions of a given state’s territory (be it a remote
mountainous peripheral location or a squatter settlement
in the capital city). They have shown the capacity to exert
violence on a large scale against outsiders and the capacity
to control violence within their respective strongholds [10].
On the other hand, the intrusion of state agencies im-
pacts on non-state local orders too. Customary systems of
order are subjected to deconstruction and re-formation as
they are incorporated into central state structures and pro-
cesses. They adopt an ambiguous position with regard to
the state, appropriating state functions and ‘state talk’, but
at the same time pursuing their own agenda under the guise
of the state authority and power. Taking state functions and
state talk on board, however, also means changing one’s
original stance. Some governments also try to deliberately
incorporate traditional authorities, in order to strengthen
state capacities and legitimacy [10].
Levitsky identified black spots as fruitful areas for op-
erations conducted by illegal groups and a first definition
may be: ““Black spots” (or “black holes”) are localized areas
within a state, over which the government has no formal
governance. The type of order prevailing in those territories
is almost always unknown by government authorities and
the international community” ([1] p. 393). Black spots or
“lawless spaces” are areas that are not governed by the
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state and underlie different forms of governance and author-
ity, often even in a hybrid way, with the participation of state
actors or agencies. For this reason, the Global Black Spot
Group, that has been researching and classifying violent
non-state actors’ blacks spots, holds that:
“Transnational vicious non-state actors use Black Spots
as locations between which they can operate undisturbed
and out of sight of international law enforcement, intelli-
gence, and security agencies. (. . . ) What they transfer in,
out, and between Black Spots are insecurity flows, defined
as movements of assets, people, services, or sensitive
know how in pursuit of illicit criminal or political gain, and
with intention of evading law enforcement, intelligence, and
related national and international agencies. Being able to
pinpoint and monitor Black Spots on an ongoing basis of-
fers the possibility of tracking the movement of criminals
and terrorists, their financial assets and illegal weapons,
and their skills and expertise. Such a capability is critical
to intelligence gathering and necessary precondition for
threat interception and the prevention of the escalation of
insecurity” [11].
In spaces where there is a functional absence of the
State, both informal economy and low social security condi-
tions spill over into other societies, leading to violence and
corrupt practices ([12] p. 42). Williams affirms that borders
are spaces where: “the strategy of the state territoriality is
dramatized and state sovereignty is paraded. It is also here
that many countervailing strategies contesting state territo-
riality are clustered” ([12] p. 44). In these frontier areas,
VNSAs are able to generate governance and sometimes
to keep peace. In many cases, black spots are formed in
places experiencing a deficit of governance of the state,
which does not guarantee basic services to the population
of those regions, causing a vacuum to be soon filled by the
governmental authority of various informal and illegal groups.
“Territorial sovereignty is being diminished on a spectrum of
issues in such a serious manner as to subvert the capacity
of states to control and protect the internal life of society, and
non-state actors hold and increasing proportion of power
and influence in the shaping of world order” ([2] p. 25).
From a policing perspective, several borders in the hemi-
sphere experience great international insecurity, which in-
tersect with international relations. In many cases, conflicts
in border zones have escalated amid border banditry and
the smuggling of people, drugs, and guns, creating tensions
both between countries and among actors in borderlands.
Other border zones are peaceful precisely because of the
actions of illegal actors that establish and maintain order [5].
Thus, there is a general tendency coming from gov-
ernments to notice some actors operating in “black spot”,
such as the aforementioned groups, with threats to interna-
tional security. This is especially true in the border areas of
Latin American that can be considered black spots, where
non-state armed groups—or more precisely Violent Non-
State Actors (VNSAs)— conduct activities such as money
laundering, arms trafficking, trafficking in persons, kidnap-
ping, smuggling, extortion, common and political crime.
Krause and Milliken identify in these “black spots” at least
six categories of VNSAS—militias, warlords, private secu-
rity providers, urban gangs, and transnational and criminal
networks, which facilitate a wider exploration of how such
groups form in relation to the state, and how the state in
turn is shaped through its interactions and conflict with the
armed group(s). [13] In turn, Aydinli defines the following
categories of VNSAS: insurgents domestic militant groups,
warlords, urban gangs, private militias/group, terrorists and
criminal organizations. [14] The author also defines the
characteristics and evolutionary dynamics from those ty-
pologies of VNSAs, reinforcing their autonomy, representa-
tion and influence, and providing a comparative analysis of
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
In according to Williams VNSAs are entities which chal-
lenge the state’s “monopoly on the use of violence within a
specified geographical territory” ([12] p. 4). VNSAs repre-
sent a departure from the traditional Westphalian system
of states in two ways: first, by providing an alternative to
state governance, and second, by challenging the state’s
monopoly of violence. VNSAs develop out of poor state
governance, but also contribute to further undermining gov-
ernance by the state. A definition of VNSA, somewhat sim-
ilar to that given by Williams, though calling those groups
of non-state armed actors, is that from Robert Mandel ([15]
p. 42) that defines them like “[. . . ] relatively autonomous
organizations (not under complete and direct state control)
with significant and sustained coercive capabilities for orga-
nized violence. Such actors have two additional features:
non-integration into formalized state institutions and a de-
gree of autonomy regarding politics, military operations, and
resources” [16].
Therefore, caution is required in the definition of black
spots. In fact, they imply on the governance out of the state,
like the non-state way of governance of VNSAs in a specific
geographic region: “providing rudimentary forms of gover-
nance in urban [and rural] areas where the state is absent.
The concept of ungoverned spaces is assumed because,
where state is absent, there is no governance. In a few
cases this might be true, but most so-called ungoverned
spaces are, in reality, alternatively and/or hybrid governed
spaces” ([12] pp. 4 and 6).
VNSAs establish new patterns of governance: within this
context, the governance standard setting is “no longer the
exclusive domain of states or governments”. When weak
states are unable to create or maintain the loyalty and alle-
giance of their populations, individuals and groups, those
latter typically revert to, or develop, alternative patterns of
affiliation [12]. Moreover, where states with low capacity
are unable to meet the demands of their citizens for secu-
rity and other public goods, other actors fill the gap. New
forms of governance or its overlap, carried out by VNSAs,
are the result of the combination of different dimensions
in a political-geographic space—the low presence of the
state, ease in fundraising and control of VNSAs of strategic
regions, questioning of the monopoly of force and coalitions
and alliances between VNSAs.
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Our theoretical framework establishes a nexus between
VNSAs and geographical scope, access to funding, re-
sources, the role of violence, the interactions between VN-
SAs and state authorities. We focus on ‘governance be-
yond governments’, or even, informal modes of governance
that emerge in spaces of limited state presence and oper-
ate ‘outside’ government’s control. Starting from Williams
(2008), the framework we employ to structure our case
study combines several strands of literature reaching a mix
of dimensions (access to funding, geographical scope, state
presence, the role of violence). An overview of the potential
determinants is presented in Figure 1. However, unlike
Williams, we do not use a mix of dimensions “to understand
the ways in which VNSAs differ from one another”. We
use such structure of dimensions to identify how VNSAs
develop an alternative governance on frontiers or how an
alternative governance from the VNSAs overlap the fragile
state governance, creating a hybrid governance [17].
Considering the ways through which they obtain financial
support or access to resources, an analysis of the funding
of VNSAs often requires a looking at their relationship with
the illicit economy at national, regional and global levels.
[13] In some cases, funds are obtained through a model
that resembles the provision of a private security service. In
other cases, the form of financing and the relation with the
form of financing react to the offensives of the central gov-
ernment. The VNSAs’ forms of funding may be connected
directly to another VNSA (which serves as the source of the
first) and based on opportunities, while keeping the focus
on their armed struggle. It can include, in some cases, the
protection of activities of the other group, by charging fees
that allowed them to maintain their violent apparatus.
As for the geostrategic positioning, some VNSAs are
relatively small and operate in a circumscribed geographical
area, while others have a wider transnational scope [13].
Empirically it is important to state that the organization and
coordination of criminal activities has increased in different
parts of a region, spreading to other countries and showing
their highest operability in border areas. Physical black
spots might exist in part or all of a city or village, part or all
of a province or country, parts of multiple countries (as in
border areas), or rivers, littorals, or the sea ([17] p. 24):
Contiguous spaces of divergent governance (border-
lands/frontiers); spaces of partially regulated, unregulated,
and illegal flows, and sharply juxtaposed spaces- whether
in cities, states, or regions- between zones of opportunities
and zones of exclusion. (. . . ) “dark networks”, which often
operate from dangerous spaces, exploit these opportunities
(. . . ) In effect, jurisdictional asymmetries encourage juris-
dictional arbitrage, provide market incentives, and offer safe
havens for dark networks [12].
As for the role of violence, although the definition of
VNSAs holds it at its core—violence is what distinguishes
VNSAs from the NGOs and transnational advocacy net-
works, that are increasingly considered as part of global
civil society. Different organizations not only use different
levels and forms of violence, but also use it for different
purposes. Finally, in what concerns the low state presence,
the state’s minimal or utilitarian presence in these regions
induces state agents, at certain moments, to favor the stock-
piling, the protection and transit of drugs or illegal weapons
in the country, or even in some cases, to directly and per-
sonally participate in the illicit business, by also forming a
criminal structure.
The following section explores the place of the deter-
minant (dimensions) in order to explain different levels of
governance in the Colombian and Venezuelan borders. In
turn, we seek to find evidences supporting our claim about
the structure of dimensions, to identify how VNSAs have
developed an alternative governance on frontiers or how
an alternative governance from the VNSAs has overlapped
the fragile state governance. Thus, we now focus on di-
mensions characterized by high levels of intervention and
activities coming from VNSAs or, at least, an ascending hy-
brid governance in the Colombian and Venezuelan borders.
3. The Presence of VNSAs in Colombia and
Venezuela Borders
Colombia and Venezuela have vast extents of land located
at their borders, corresponding to approximately 2,219 km,
and also characterized by heavy economic and human
flows, as well as licit and illicit activities. Illicit activities
are carried out in this area by insurgents, criminal groups,
paramilitaries and drug trafficking agents, and usually co-
exist with those licit border activities developed by the local
population of both countries [18]. In some cases, however,
these black spots end up by giving no alternatives to the
local population, but to engage in illicit businesses just for
the sake of survival.
In the attempt to identify the most affected regions, the
data collected from the newspaper articles and reported
in the chart below, show that the most significant VNSAs
on the frontier between Colombia and Venezuela was the
National Liberation Army (ELN , Eje´rcito de Liberacio´n Na-
cional, in Spanish) [19], with 31% of territorial presence
in the border area, followed by the BACRIM [20] (like the
Usuga Clan, or Clan Usuga, in Spanish) [21], the Rastro-
jos [22] and the People’s Liberation Army (EPL, Eje´rcito
Popular de Liberacio´n, in Spanish) with 24% of occupation,
and finally by the smugglers, with 17%. Besides that, it was
also possible to observe a certain equilibrium between the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, in Spanish) with
9% of territorial presence in the border area, before being
demobilized in 2017 [23], and BACRIM, which behaviour is
similar to the one of neo-paramilitary groups [24].
Differently from the guerrilla and the paramilitaries, the
BACRIM do not follow any hierarchy or any centralized or-
ganizational model, although they are committed to a model
of “franchises” launched by drug traffickers and the United
Self-Defenses of Colombia (AUC, or Autodefensas Unidas
de Colombia, in Spanish). In 2008, according to the data
presented by Tickner et al., [2] BACRIM were present in
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246 Colombian municipalities of the and organized in 100
units under 21 different organizations:
Its criminal profile is wider and more flexible, since they
engage in multiple activities related to cocaine trafficking,
agricultural inputs and fuel; the kidnapping and extortion
of rural areas; and micro trafficking and murder by order
in urban areas. In addition, BACRIM participate of the in-
termediate stages of the drug trafficking chain, such as
the purchase of cocaine base, production of hydrochloride,
custody and transport, as well as the control of the micro
trafficking of the domestic consumption ([2], p. 424).
In the 2000s, there was an intense displacement of VN-
SAs in direction to the Colombia and Venezuela border
caused by the FARC debilitation to react to government
military actions. The result was a dispute between AUC and
FARC in coca crop areas and territorial control over some
distribution drug chains. However, some groups like AUC
disappeared as organization, practically until 2006, because
of the governmental demobilization programs undertaken
by Uribe Government (2002-2010) in Colombia. However,
aimed to fill the vacuum left by the AUC, a lot of members
from that group were reorganized into other BACRIM such
as Los Rastrojos and the Usuga Clan, which ascended to be
a warehouse for smuggling and drug trafficking ([25] p. 13).
Figure 1. VNSAs in the Colombia and Venezuela Borders.
Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on data from
selected newspaper articles.
4. Dimensions of VNSAs Presence in the Colombian
and Venezuelan Borders
In the analysis about alternative forms of governance on
border areas, as the ones derived by the VNSAs, the focus
on those dimensions defined in the theoretical framework
appears to be determinant, mainly when it concerns the
high presence and action of VNSAs in the rising black spots
on the Colombia and Venezuela’s borders.
The Figure 2 depicts the four dimensions elaborated
and analysed in the theoretical framework and upon which
we are going to structure the case study of this paper. A
further and more detailed analysis of each dimension is of-
fered below, starting with a review of the funding means and
illegal activities as a facilitating condition for VNSAs. The
following section is focusing on more traditional dimensions,
like territorial and strategic control and low state presence.
The last section looks at VNSAS violent practices between
them and against the state itself. The data discussion of
each dimension is weighed against the analytical debate of
governance in the last section of the paper.
4.1. Funding and Illegal Activities
Illegal exploitation of gold, coltan and tungsten has become
a major source of funding for the FARC in recent years,
along with extortion and drug trafficking; while, historically,
the main source of ELN funding is the kidnapping. [26]
The ELN “political kidnapping”, as they were called, served
mainly to finance the organization itself, although some of
them had the principal purpose of exchanging victims for
guerrilla prisoners, and in this context, these actions seem
very similar to the ones undertaken by the FARC in search-
ing for a “humanitarian agreement”. Furthermore, the ELN
has reactivated other sources of financing such as gasoline
smuggling on the border with Venezuela and drug trafficking
that ease the purchase of weapons, logistical materials and
campaign and the maintenance of the troops [27].
In the specific case of the Usuga Clan, the main source
of income for the group comes from drug trafficking. When
it comes to this illicit activity, the Gulf’s Clan is similar to
its rivals, like the Rastrojos or the Paisas, in that they are
uninterested in controlling the entire chain of drug produc-
tion. But they have not proved themselves as adept as the
Rastrojos when it comes to broker key alliances with other
major players in the drug trade. The Usuga Clan bought
coca base from the FARC, however the two groups are not
collaborating much further than that. On the other hand,
the main income sources of the Rastrojos come from the
control of drug trafficking in Valle del Cauca, as well as
other illegal activities in the region such as extortion, hired
killers and drug micro-trafficking. Despite this, they also
sought to concentrate their efforts on other illicit activity,
besides drug trafficking, like illegal mining of mainly gold
mines (carried out without mining titles or controls by the
Colombian government) [28,29].
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Figure 2. Dimensions on the Performance of VNSAs. Source: Developed by the authors, based on the Literature.
In an interview that took place in Caracas, on July 31st
of 2014, a further detailed description of the panorama of
violence in Venezuela was reported, focusing on the phe-
nomenon of the spread of VNSAs in the Venezuelan terri-
tory. According to the interviewed, the drug corridor extends
between Ta´chira, Zulia and Maracaibo, until reaching the
main ports of the country, such as the Port of Paranagua´,
Porto Cabello, Guanta and La Guajira. Already in the Apure
region it is possible to observe the presence of members
of the FARC, to whom the small local farmers need to pay
the “vacuma”, some forms of “taxes” (extortion). Moreover,
according to the report, the region is also characterized by
intense smuggling, with strong corruption of local agents,
who, in some cases practice extortion too. Lastly, as re-
ferred by the academic, the region is marked by the pres-
ence of kidnappings, homicides, smuggling and extortion
[30,31].
The financing size analysis shows different ways through
which VNSAs governance is emerging. On one hand, VN-
SAs is controlling sources of financing arising from illicit
activities. When small farmers or even groups of drug traf-
fickers are required to pay a monthly fee to groups of guerril-
las, a kind of tax that only the state could charge, new forms
of governance are created, that overlap those of the state.
Moreover, as noted by Bruce Bagley, it is observable that
VNSAs can generate illicit drug markets, and illicit activities
“because it keeps moving throughout the borders, running
from local authorities and from their military actions” [32].
On the other hand, and principally consistent with
Williams framework, these groups get funding in an econ-
omy that varies significantly among national, regional and
global scale. At the national level, although they partic-
ipate in different informal and illegal drug, mining and
smuggling markets, these VNSAs also obtain resources
through the provision of “private” security services to local
communities or even national groups, or sometimes even
through the receiving of money from local criminal groups’
“franchises”[33]. The growing specialization of the different
groups in the control of criminal economies spread through-
out the national territory. The groups favor a networked
control of illicit economies, outsourcing some parts of these
activities to other smaller unities:
It is noteworthy how it can be highly lucrative to partic-
ipate in crossings precisely where they are illegal; when
states define certain activities as illegal, they create a risk
premium for undertaking the activity. The opportunity for
increased gain naturally leads actors engage both legal and
illegal transactions to seek to influence the politics of border
control, and thus rules governing economic exchanges [5].
At the regional level, groups such as BACRIM partici-
pate in the chain-of-trade of regional drug traffickers or by
charging “tolls” to facilitate the outbound routes to Central
America and the Northern market or even through direct
marketing of drugs with Mexican drug cartels. Globally
speaking, they have become key drug brokers, in the Colom-
bian Pacific and the Venezuelan Caribbean Sea of lots of
illicit drugs that are sent to European, American or Asian
markets.
Then, low state regulation, corruption, high levels of vio-
lence and self-financing possibilities for the VNSAs may in-
dicate, in the case of the Colombian border with Venezuela,
the rupture of the institutional environment. Furthermore,
this may also contribute to generate alternative and informal
forms of governance that can survive or even emerge in
the absence of the state or with partial statehood. Such
reality is observed by Fro¨din mainly in the Americas, where
some spaces are governed by alternative forms of power,
based on “law of the strongest”, and where relations are
based on personal standards, as well as on bonds of trust
and fear ([34], p. 274). They are internally fragmented
countries, with serious failures of formal governance, where
informal institutions end up occupying the vacuum of power
left by the central authority and leading to hybrid ways of
governance.
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4.2. Key Geographical Position and Scope
Given the geostrategic position, some VNSAs are relatively
small and operate in a circumscribed geographical area,
while others have a wider transnational scope [13]. Em-
pirically, it is important to state that there was an increase
in the organization and coordination of criminal activities
in different parts of a region and that those activities have
overlapped other countries. Therefore, it results that these
groups are highly operatives in border areas ([35] p. 24).
In their search for profits, VNSAs would accept a higher
risk to get a convenient geographical base, as well as prox-
imity to the global marketplace. A strategic region for these
groups is represented by the frontiers of many weak states;
in fact, border regions possesses geographical, political,
economic and social features, like low institutional presence
of the state, strategic position, necessary infrastructure and
a minimal and utilitarian presence of governments agents,
that transform this area in an operational refuge for VNSAs.
The VNSAs are present in all the places of the border
between Colombia and Venezuela, leaving no border de-
partment free from their presence. According to the data,
it seems important to note that the Colombian border re-
gion with the biggest incidence of VNSAs (with 44% of
presence) is Norte Santander department (borders with the
Venezuelan department of Ta´chira). This department is in
fact the most populated and urbanized one, compared to
Guajira (borders with the Venezuelan department of Zulia)
and Arauca (borders with the Venezuelan department of
Apure). Ta´chira and Zulia represent 58% of the incidence
of VNSAs in the frontier region between both countries (see
Figure 3).
Therefore, Venezuela’s strategic location is crucial for
the profit calculations and interests of illegal armed groups,
as the country has 4,000 km of maritime border with the
Caribbean and 185 km with the Atlantic Ocean, and a se-
ries of ports along the coast, as Maracaibo, La Guaira´ and
Puerto Cabello, from which illicit trafficking can be disposed
of both in Central America and in Europe ([36] p. 9). Ariel
A´vila has shown that some “neo-paramilitary”—or BACRIM
groups—were allocated in the region, forming, according
to the author, a “criminal structure” of charges against drug
traffickers and extortion of civilians.
Furthermore, if we consider the dimension of geostrate-
gic geographical position and the scope, this latter took
place through an intense work of agreements and alliances
and the building up of societies with diverse structures of
organized crime at a local and regional level, seeking to
dominate the whole chain of the drug trafficking business
and other illicit activities, like smuggling. Analyzing the
agreements contracted between VNSAs, in the Colombian
border regions with Ecuador, Annette Idler points out that:
in reality, the categories are very fluid and flexible, and
the lines between the different types of arrangement that
exists between one or more groups with another or other
groups can evolve into another one, meaning: spot sales
may evolve into a strategic alliance ([4] pp. 68–69).
Finally, in the understanding of the key geographical
spaces occupied by VNSAs it is also important to consider
the transnational links of the BACRIM with other criminal
groups outside the country. Of the three main BACRIM,
two of them, the Usuga Clan and the ELP, have maintained
transnational business networks with the Mexican Cartel of
Sinaloa, one of the two most powerful Mexican drug traffick-
ing organizations. On the other hand, official sources de-
tected that the Sinaloa Cartel was financing those BACRIM
engaged in robbery, while the Cartel was also working for
the largest criminal organization in Colombia, the Usuga
Clan. [37]. For Clunan and Trinkunas to the extent that
VNSAs are present in a certain space, then they generate:
(i) disorder, with the use of force in a systematic way; (ii)
contested spaces, with the formation of rules, norms and
the generation of an own authority; these spaces may begin
to generate insecurity, especially if they overflow to a border
country or if in that space proliferate activities related to
transnational crime ([3] p. 26).
4.3. Low State Presence
It can be argued, according to official data, that between the
years 2011–2014, there was a decrease in the efficiency
and presence of the Colombian state in the border depart-
ments with Venezuela, resulting in a zero-sum outcome that
erased the progress made in the item “effectiveness”, which
had improved in all departments bordering Venezuela, as
reported in the Table 1. In addition, the data show that
the presence of the Colombian state has generally failed
to be strong in those departments, with the exception, and
a slight improvement, in the North of Santander. There
was, on the other hand, a good improvement in the rates of
Guajira. Meanwhile, both Arauca and Cesar Departments
presented a slight worsening in the rates of the Colombian
state’s presence, at the same period. It can be argued
that the departments (except the Arauca department that
was absent) witnessed increasing rates of unemployment,
ranging from 9% to 12%, and medium and high GINI rates
over a ten years period, indicating socioeconomic difficulties
among the local population.
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Figure 3. VNSAs into strategic departments. Elaborated by the authors, based on data from selected newspaper articles
from the region [38–74].
Figure 4. Political map of the border between Colombia and Venezuela [75].
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2011 37.8 58.7 59.2 77.4 69.5
2014 47.3 45.8 69.9 66.6 66.6
Status Increased Decreased Increased Decreased Decreased
Arauca
2011 15.6 65.7 71.1 76.7 77.3
2014 81.3 59.0 81.9 76.6 76.6
Status Increased Decreased Increased Decreased Decreased
La Guajira
2011 13.3 52.2 61.4 37.6 70.2
2014 78.4 41.9 77.5 79.8 79.8
Status Increased Decreased Increased Increased Increased
Nte. Santander
2011 61.9 58.8 68.9 64.7 63.4
2014 77.6 47.4 79.6 67.6 67.6
Status Increased Decreased Increased Increased Increased
The relation between low state presence and criminal
gangs’ issues is outlined in the security field, when people
at the border area accept the idea that security, which in
thesis should be offered by the State, exists in part because
groups like BRACRIM have imposed that, in any way. As re-
ported by the testimony of an inhabitant of the region: “You
can leave the door open because you know that if you act
badly they will kill you. It’s like a mentality; if you do some-
thing bad, like stealing or fighting, an armed guy will come
and kill you” [34]. “With the exception of the occasional
motorized patrol of heavily armed police, the state—and the
right—is completely absent. Similarly, they are also absent
in many neighborhoods and cities in Latin America, where
violence continues to change—inter-gang conflicts, drug
trafficking, racial, political, or social extermination projects”
([77] p. 470).
The analysis of the low statehood at the Colombia and
Venezuela border has become important because of the
centrality of this space for a series of activities that have
begun to overlap and, therefore, to turn out the area into
multimodal transit zone, allowing for outlawed groups to
carry out activities such as trafficking, stockpiling and hid-
ing products, money laundering, weapons buying, among
others. But on the other hand, these illicit activities have
ended up generating a series of unlawful “public goods”—
labor markets, security that is not offered by the state and
supply of goods and consumer products. Moreover, facing
the displacement of trade, either by outlaw groups, illicit
flow and civilians affected by conflict, borders became a
suitable locus for refuge, support and transit of those actors.
The illegal transit that has been occurring in the border area
between Colombia and Venezuela, namely drug and arms
trafficking, as well as the use of the region as a refuge by
unlawful armed groups—like the ELN and BACRIM— are
real “black spots”, in which the presence of the state is
weak related to the formulation of public policy and effective
appropriation of space.
According to Avila , there are regions in which differ-
ent forms of illegal authorities operate, with the rise of a
political elite linked to crime and the presence of territo-
rial disputes over drug trafficking routes to the guerrilla
groups This increased pressure in the border area, says
Avila, is due mainly to the disposal of police officers from
both nationalities, in coalition with drug traffickers, which
can lead to increasing tension between these countries.
So, the scholar highlights three trends that have intensified
the problem of the region: i) collaboration or negligence of
local official agents; ii) inability of governance in the region;
iii) increasing institutional instability of local and regional
administrations in the border zone [6].
Hence, a key question is the extent to which the VNSAs
has become an alternative form of governance and is fulfill-
ing functions that normally are of the responsibility of the
state, such as health, safety, infrastructure construction and
urban sanitation. Thus, it is important to determine what
kind of capacity gaps and functional holes are filled by VN-
SAs. So, these can include the provision of state functions,
like the imposing and maintaining of security and order,
while they can also extend to what might be described as
paternalistic forms of social welfare. Indeed, for VNSAs
the filling of functional spaces is often even more important
than filling territorial spaces ([17] p. 8). This indicates that
when VNSAS establish themselves on a frontier, the most
important thing for them is not to dominate the territory of
that border through armed means or establishing forms of
authority in that territory, but it results to be more effective
whether they are able to gain a certain social legitimacy
by filling the functions that the state does not provide such
as safety, health and job creation. The governance failure
by the central authorities of the states ends up generating
small “black spots” usually located in neighborhoods where
the police does not enter and therefore creating parallel
ends to formal social norms.
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4.4. Violence
Smugglers and narcotraffickers have also used the pro-
tection offered by BACRIM, which gradually became more
present on the border between Colombia and Venezuela,
after the 2000s. In the same period, the increased num-
ber of paramilitary groups in the region, sharing an area
that was witnessing an augmenting of illegal practices of
narcotrafficking and smuggling, resulted in many aggres-
sive disputes, among which, the most violent one was the
Bahia Portete massacre, in 2004, against the indigenous
women from the Wayu´u community. Paramilitary groups, in
particular the Jorge 40, profited from the internal disputes
inside the Wayu´u community to attack its women, that were
ravished, tortured and most of them disappeared. This mas-
sacre, other than clearly demonstrate the violent disputes
in the region, is significant to highlight the cruel fact that the
vulnerable groups, and in this specific case we are talking
of a double vulnerable group (indigenous and women), are
the first and the most affected targets of violence [78].
Violence assumes different forms in the border region
and its use is also related to the high incidence of activities
exerted by the different types of VNSAs, like kidnappings,
extortion, deaths, among others. Regarding the data on se-
curity and violence, it can be observed that homicide rates
in Norte Santander department are higher than the national
and regional average; furthermore, kidnapping rates in the
departments of Arauca are four times higher than the na-
tional average (Table 2). It should be highlighted that the
Arauca department is one of the main sources of funding
for some VNSAs, like the ELN. Moreover, the hectares of
coca planted in the Department of Santander are also four
times higher than the national average. On the other hand,
in the Colombian side, the regions La Guajira and Cu´cuta
are the most violent ones, since they present the highest
homicide rates in their departments.
According to the project “Rutas del conflicto” from Cen-
tro Nacional de Memoria Histo´rica de Colombia (Routes
of the conflict—National Center of Historical Memory of
Colombia), between 1982 and 2013, the BACRIM or neop-
aramilitaries were responsible for the vast majority of deaths
in Colombia, committing a total number of 1,166 massacres.
They were followed by unidentified armed groups with 295
massacres, the FARC guerrilla with 238 cases, and 139
massacres were committed by the security forces [79].
According to statistics, 6,729 people were abducted by
the ELN, which is heavily concentrated on the Colombian
border with Venezuela, especially in the departments of
Norte Santander (Colombia) and Apure (Venezuela), be-
tween 1985 and 2015. Of these people, 148 would have
died in captivity. In addition, more recent data showed that
the FARC has appeared until its demobilization as the al-
leged perpetrator in 33% of the cases while it has been
confirmed in 37% of them; the BACRIM has obtained a
percentage of 27% and 20% respectively; while the ELN
scores 25% cases as presumed author and 30% as con-
firmed. In addition, data from the Pais Libre Foundation
indicates that, in a historical series between 1996 and 2008,
the sum of kidnappings in the departments of the border
between Colombia and Venezuela (Guajira, Cesar, Norte
de Santander, Boyaca´, Arauca, Vichada and Guainı´a) was
the largest number of all the border areas of Colombia, with
a total of 5,786 people kidnapped [31].
Finally, when the VNSAs action comes to the dimension
of violence it is also admitting that VNSAs have achieved
some degrees of autonomy and can exercise those gov-
ernance functions that are not provided by the state. The
local population has often been forced to move, either in-
ternally or to neighboring territories, and when the state
can not exercise its authority effectively, it delegates vio-
lence to other actors, allowing for the emergence of the
neo-paramilitary groups. Some officers have pointed out
that the state, by recognizing its deficiencies, has allowed
the use of weapons by peasants to defend themselves and
sometimes to attack guerrilla members. [80] This means
that sometimes the state empowers social actors of the
population with violence functions. It is an attitude that
should be avoided both because the state does not have
the capacity to control the use of means of violence by the
population and also because the states is easily opting for
delegating to the population the fight against VNSAS and
consequently affecting the state’s monopoly of force. [37]
VNSAs are inherently “illegitimate vis-a`-vis the classical
state system in part because the essence of being a state
is having a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Yet,
they often provide alternative governance, offering services
and supplying collective goods that the state is unable or
unwilling to offer and provide” ([12] p. 6).








Homicides 264 286 461
Kidnappings 3 3 9
Common theft 2.096 2.600 4.041
Hectares of Coca 13 178 1.460
Arauca
Homicides 165 100 461
Kidnappings 35 8 9
Common theft 536 965 4.041
Hectares of Coca 69 1.239 1.460
Guajira
Homicides 189 286 461
Kidnappings 3 3 9
Common theft 1.027 2.600 4.041
Hectares of Coca 6 178 1.460
Norte
Santander
Homicides 524 372 461
Kidnappings 15 10 9
Common theft 2.566 4.144 4.041
Hectares of Coca 6.345 1.610 1.460
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5. Final Remarks
The case of the Colombian and Venezuelan borders shows
that within this context, the governance standard setting is
“no longer the exclusive domain of states or governments”
([81] p. 11). A diversity of actors, such as rebels and neop-
aramilitaries can now communicate more effectively and
disseminate new standards of governance. Some of the
Colombian and Venezuelan borders can be defined like
black spots, but in line with the theoretical development it
doesn’t mean that they are non-governed areas, on the
contrary, they are not completely governed by the state or
that such areas show limited statehood. The governance
out the state, like the one coming from criminal groups of
insurgents, is a way to check the absence of the state in
one specific geographic region and show that VNSAs are
certainly able, at least, to “provide rudimentary forms of
governance in urban [and rural] areas where the state is
absent” ([17] p. 4).
Black spots can appear, such as the data have shown,
both in more developed urban region, like the Departments
of Santander and Ta´chira (in Colombia and Venezuela, re-
spectively), as well as in a less developed region in the
rural areas along the Arauca Department borders. More-
over these black spots can present many possibilities of
dimensions—from funding until violence. Such a territo-
rial coverage of the VNSAS is explained by the fact that
the state’s presence with its public policies is not homo-
geneous, meaning with this that, in many urbanized and
populated regions as well as in rural regions, some areas
are less provided by state assistance and less served by
public policies.
This could lead to the question whether the state is inter-
ested to be present in such regions, or whether it is conve-
nient for it to leave poor areas under the control of VNSAs.
In fact, it is possible to advance the hypothesis that it may
be opportune for the state, for electoral reasons, to justify
the implementation of repressive policies of public security,
or even because the VNSAs acting in the black spots pro-
vide “public goods” for the population—security, food, fuel,
medicines, among others—that the national government is
unable to provide. On the other hand, it is possible to ob-
serve black spots, on Colombia and Venezuela borders, in
which the presence of VNSAs makes the social institutional
governance dependent on the income generated by illicit
economies, implying alternative modes of subordination to
illegal actors. In fact, if the population and entrepreneurs’
levels of consumption depend on the illegal income, then
their subordination to illegal actors is complete and and
repressive state governance policy, to combat organized
crime in these territories, may not be feasible [82].
Where there is a functional absence of the state, in-
formal economy and low social security conditions, the
practice of crimes is favored. Sometimes, as in the case
of Venezuela, even when the regulatory presence of the
state exist—through members of the armed forces—the cor-
ruption of officers leads to a spillover effect towards other
societies, leading to violence and corrupt practices. In other
words, the penetration of official institutions, which in princi-
ple should combat illicit activities, is not limited to the border,
but gradually problems such as corruption, violence and
drug trafficking are spreading even into the territory of the
neighboring country.
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